"Troops Honed in '03 Fighting a Different War in Iraq," by Thomas E. Ricks - the Washington Post, 18 Feb 2006 (registration required)
BAGHDAD -- During his first tour in Iraq two years ago, recalled Army Sgt. James Eyler, "the mindset of the whole unit was, if they pose a threat at all, shoot to kill."
Back then, "we didn't trust any Iraqis," he added as he manned a machine gun atop a Humvee and prepared to go out on a night raid this week. These days, Eyler says he is forcing himself to be more patient with Iraqis. "Now we understand that to get out of here, we're going to have to," he said.
In many respects, the war in Iraq in 2006 isn't the same as the one that was being fought in 2003-04, when the insurgency was emerging and taking U.S. commanders by surprise. No one in the U.S. military may understand the changes better than troops who were part of the initial occupation and have returned for a second tour -- and are being trained to be less quick on the trigger and more ready to give Iraqis the benefit of the doubt.
Said another machine gunner, Sgt. James Russell: "It's a lot less brute force and a lot more hearts-and-minds now."
Some soldiers' comments seem to reflect a growing sense that the U.S. military committed several major errors in 2003-04, when it lacked cultural understanding and tended to use force as the tool of first resort. "The first time we were here, there was a lot of overreacting," said Staff Sgt. Jesse Sample. "Now, with experience, we react a lot more calmly." Like all the other soldiers interviewed for this article, Sample is a member of the U.S. Army's 4th Infantry Division, which was headquartered in Tikrit in 2003-04 and is now based in Baghdad.
Preparing for a convoy on a particularly bomb-infested stretch of highway south of the capital, Sample added, "This tour is 180 degrees different from the last time." Now, he said, "we don't roll out into the city intimidating anyone we see."
Last time, Sgt. Kris Vanmarren saw his mission as being to "bust up the insurgency." This time, he said, it is geared more toward supporting Iraqi security forces -- outfitting their checkpoints, helping with their training and providing perimeter security for their operations.
"The focus has definitely shifted," agreed Capt. Klaudius Robinson, the Polish-born commander of a cavalry troop based south of Baghdad. On his current tour, he estimates, he spends half his time on "engagement" with the population, perhaps a quarter working with Iraqi forces and "maybe 20 percent going after the bad guys."
Robinson noted that every patrol he sends out includes an interpreter, in contrast to the first year of the U.S. military presence here. "It's a huge difference" being able to communicate clearly instead of using "hand signals and broken English."
In 2003-04, the 4th Infantry had a rash of abuse cases, including some illegal killings of detainees. For its second tour, the division has its own cultural adviser, who writes a kind of advice column on Islamic and Iraqi mores in the Ivy Leaf, the division newspaper....
Of more than a dozen soldiers asked to compare their first and second tours of duty, all agreed that the rules of engagement that govern the use of force have grown much tighter, and most said they thought the new restrictions were for the good. "It's a little bit harder. You're kind of tied down," said Ilaoa. Even so, he said, "we treat locals a lot better and have a lot better relations with them."
In 2003, if two men were seen walking on a road in the middle of the night and carrying shovels, they would be assumed to be planting bombs and be shot, said Capt. John Moris. But "what was allowed during the first tour in Iraq, isn't," he said. Now the order likely would be to detain and question the men, if possible.
On their bases, the troops of the 4th Infantry have found new comforts during this tour. In 2003, "we didn't get a lot of rest, and we lived on MREs and water," Russell said, referring to the packaged rations called Meals Ready to Eat. Now food is plentiful, and tailored to the palates of young men happy to dine on unlimited cheeseburgers, soft drinks and ice cream.
Almost all troops sleep in air-conditioned rooms and have ready access to the Internet. Forward Operating Base Falcon even boasts a pseudo nightclub, The Velvet Camel, which serves alcohol-free beer and advertises that "every Friday night is Hip-Hop Night," featuring "the Desert Pimps."
When troops leave the base for patrols or raids, they are better protected than in the past. Robinson recalled that many soldiers in 2003 had "the old Vietnam-era flak vest," which lacked bullet-stopping plates. Now everyone heading out wears improved body armor with solid plates, and machine gunners working atop vehicles also have thick face shields and are surrounded by an armored turret.
Today's war is so different that commanders said they occasionally keep a wary eye on troops who served in Iraq in 2003-04. Capt. Bret Lindberg, a troop commander, said "some of the guys who have been here before think they can make Iraqis do whatever they want, especially to ensure their own security...I have to hold them back a bit."
Also see "Cultural Insensitivity" Hampers US Army in Iraq, British Officer Says and Public Interactions Part of New US Army Focus (which links to a January 2006 article by Ricks on this topic).
Added 19 Feb 2006:
"US Troops Taught Iraqi Gestures" - BBC News, 19 Feb 2006
The US military has funded a computer game to teach its troops how to use and decipher Iraqi body language.
The purpose is to teach soldiers that using the wrong gestures can potentially cause offence and escalate already tense situations.
In the program, users must build trust with local people through verbal communication and gestures....
The program teaches military personnel some key gestures such as an up-down movement with the right hand to ask someone to slow down and gives them tips such as removing mirror sunglasses when approaching local people.
"In Iraq, to show sincerity you have to put more effort into your gestures," said Dr. [Hannes] Vilhjalmsson [a University of Southern California research scientist who is one of the program's creators].
"In Western countries, we control our body language more. In Arabic culture, it is important you show how open you are."
He added that reserved body language in exchanges with local people could be interpreted as having something to hide in Iraq, potentially escalating a tense situation.
Military personnel also learn that people can approach each other more closely than one normally might in the West.
Dr Vilhjalmsson said it was important troops should not automatically interpret close proximity in an exchange as a threat.
And the game teaches them that pointing the finger at a person can be considered aggressive in Arab cultures...
The University of Southern California is also working on other versions of the game: Tactical Pashto, which trains troops in communication specific to Afghanistan; and Tactical Levantine, which teaches them Arabic language and gestures specific to Lebanon and other surrounding areas....
An Iraqi told me once that hand gestures used by US soldiers at checkpoints in Baghdad were confusing to Iraqi drivers. Americans would hold up their hands, palm facing the driver, to mean 'stop'; to Iraqis, it meant 'go away' -- and if they acted on that interpretation, there was a risk that US soldiers would think they were bad guys fleeing the scene and fire at them. For an interesting account by a former Marine officer on coping with checkpoint communications with the public, see the excerpts from Nathaniel Flick's 13 March 2005 New York Times op ed included in Iraq PM Criticizes Checkpoint Procedures.
For another, sobering, perspective on the US' revised strategy in Iraq, see:
"Strategy Tragedy?" by Dexter Filkins - the New York Times Sunday Magazine, 19 Feb 2006
...In nearly every military and diplomatic realm, the American effort in Iraq is finally beginning to show the careful planning and concentrated thinking that seemed to vanish the moment American troops entered Baghdad on April 9, 2003. We've heard progress reports in the past, of course, and they have often preceded a stunning setback. But what is new is the level of sophistication that Americans are bringing to their work, and the intensity of their engagement across so many fronts.
A more subtle response to the insurgency was a long time in the making. American generals were caught flat-footed by the resistance that bloomed in 2003; they didn't plan for it, and they had no playbook to fight it. The result in the field often amounted to a war of attrition, which was designed to kill and capture as many insurgents as possible but which ended up alienating Iraqi civilians. These days, however, the military is making new efforts to help local Iraqis feel safe and secure in their homes. The two top American commanders, Gen. George Casey and Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli, are proponents of placing far less emphasis on killing guerrillas and much more on working with the locals. In Baghdad, General Casey has set up a local counterinsurgency school, through which American officers must pass before they can head into the field. Find an American officer these days, and he is likely to tell you about the police officers he is supervising or the local council he's helping to set up.
A new approach is equally evident at the American Embassy, where the current ambassador and erstwhile neoconservative, Zalmay Khalilzad, is employing a hands-on strategy that is positively Kissingerian in its realism. On some days, Khalilzad, a native of Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan, and a Sunni Muslim, sits with Iraqi leaders for hours, fingering his prayer beads and hearing their complaints. In that sense, Ambassador Khalilzad could hardly differ more from his two predecessors, L. Paul Bremer III, who dispatched orders with the curtness of a viceroy, and John Negroponte, who, on instructions from Washington, stood largely out of view.
According to Iraqis and Western diplomats, Ambassador Khalilzad is orchestrating an extraordinarily ambitious power play: coaxing Sunni political leaders into the government while splitting the more moderate Iraqi insurgents from the beheaders and suicide bombers of Al Qaeda. If he succeeds, Khalilzad could remake the political landscape, curtail the insurgency and give the Iraqi government a bit of solid ground to stand on. If he doesn't succeed, the possibilities are endless, few of them good....
"Threats Weaken US Overtures to Sunnis," by Antonio Castaneda - AP (Ramadi, Iraq), 19 Feb 2006
Insurgents are targeting tribal sheiks and other Sunni Arab community leaders, seeking to undermine U.S. efforts to enlist them in weakening the rebellion, U.S. and Iraqi officials say.
American officials have been saying for months that force alone cannot end the insurgency. Instead, they believe a deal with Sunni Arabs willing to lay down their arms and join the political process offers the best way to peace.
At first, U.S. overtures were met with cold indifference in Ramadi — effectively the capital of Iraq's insurgency.
But in late November, tribal chiefs, religious leaders, former army officers and hundreds of ordinary Iraqis met with U.S. commanders in Ramadi for a conference promoted as a public discussion on how to get the Americans out of Iraq.
For the first time key religious and tribal leaders negotiated in earnest on key points, U.S. commanders said, progress that led to the creation of a negotiating team — the Anbar Security Council. Sunni Arabs — the community supporting the backbone of the insurgency — were finally at the bargaining table.
But the insurgents have struck back. Within weeks, three sheiks, including one prominent leader on the council, Nasr al-Fahdawi, were assassinated. Another sheik escaped death when his house was bombed while he was away.
U.S. officials maintain that the attacks are a sign of desperation by insurgents fearful of Sunni Arabs joining the political process.
"They're grasping for straws. They're attacking the sheiks ... because they know they've worn out their welcome," said Marine Lt. Col. Roger Turner, who commands the 3rd Battalion, 7th Regiment. "These guys are now trying to spoil (negotiations) and they know that if Sunnis start participating, which they're doing, they'll lose their grip."
Following the November meeting, the sheiks gave their blessing to recruitment drives for soldiers and police. About 1,100 men applied for defunct police forces in early January. The sheiks' clout was on display — only dozens of Iraqis had responded to previous recruitment drives.
Then, on Jan. 5, insurgents sent a man with explosives strapped to his body into a line of police recruits in Ramadi, killing 58 Iraqis and two U.S. troops.
The message reverberated across Ramadi.
"It's slowed down the process," Turner said of the insurgent attacks. "I'd say it's affected it but it hasn't stopped it ... the recruiting is slower but it's still coming."...
The insurgents' willingness to confront leaders of ancient tribes either showed their confidence or a brash disregard for respected local leaders. U.S. commanders hope the strategy will backfire, but some also fear that the attacks may have been internal coups orchestrated by upstart tribesmen.
Some Iraqi officials, for example, suspect that pro- al-Qaida in Iraq members of Sheik Nasr's own family killed him and that a blood feud could sprout from the assassination.
Meanwhile, insurgents have stepped up a scorched earth strategy to undermine the Anbar provincial government. A major telecommunications center was burned down this month, leaving Ramadi with no local phone service.
Newspapers are rarely sold and national television networks often do not reach Ramadi. Power plants have also been targeted in the past.
Nevertheless, local Iraqi officials say they will persevere with their contacts with the Americans and their Iraqi partners. U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad has offered to help free up reconstruction funds for the province, U.S. commanders say....
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