"Rerun Our Cold War Cultural Diplomacy," by Alan Riding - The New York Times, 27 Oct 2005
PARIS, Oct. 26 - Who can doubt the appeal of American popular culture? If it dominates much of the world, it is because much of the world consumes it with relish. Indeed, while rejecting United States foreign policy, people in many countries happily embrace America's movies, television programs and pop music. Even Iranians lap up "Baywatch" via satellite....
Yet almost out of earshot, questions are being asked about whether it is wise for the United States's cultural image to be shaped exclusively by the marketplace. More specifically, with Washington now dusting off public diplomacy as a strategy to combat rampant anti-Americanism, is it time to revive cultural diplomacy?
The purpose would not be to mute American popular culture. Instead, rather than trying to compete for the attention of the masses, cultural diplomacy would aim to persuade political and intellectual elites of the virtues of American civilization.
This approach is now being quietly promoted by several arts lobbies in the United States. In a letter to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in July, a group called Americans for International Arts and Cultural Exchange wrote: "Our coalition believes America has many cultural capabilities and talents that remain underutilized in the international arena and which can be effective in reaching out and telling our story to the world."
The administration official charged with repairing America's image is Karen P. Hughes, the newly named undersecretary for public diplomacy and public affairs. In an address to her staff last month, she acknowledged that popular culture can be a two-edged sword. "Our music and film industries, our artists and entertainers create very powerful impressions, sometimes good, sometimes bad, but they're always, always powerful," Ms. Hughes said.
At the same time, the State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs is giving some of its cultural programming a sharper political focus. For instance, working with Jazz at Lincoln Center, it has arranged for musicians affected by Hurricane Katrina, including the Preservation Hall Jazz Band, to visit countries that provided help to disaster victims. Such cultural diplomacy, though, still lacks the financing and political backing needed to be more than symbolic....
Clearly, just as Islamic fundamentalism poses a threat different from Communist totalitarianism, the cold war model of cultural diplomacy - designed essentially for Europe - needs revising if it is to win over key opinionmakers in the Middle East and Muslim Asia.
"The new situation is much more multipolar," said Frank Hodsoll, who led the National Endowment for the Arts under the Reagan administration and is now chairman of the Center for Arts and Culture in Washington. "There's a need for more effort in a lot more places where cultures are much more different."
In a joint study last year, Mr. Hodsoll's center and the Coalition for American Leadership Abroad offered suggestions: increasing cultural exchanges, facilitating visits to the United States by foreign artists and scholars, sponsoring trips abroad by American artists, reopening libraries and cultural centers and expanding English-language programs and cultural workshops.
It also proposed adding $10 million to cultural financing by the State Department (which stands, this year, at a modest $4.05 million) and called for greater involvement by the private sector. "Corporations could be doing much more," said Stefan Toepler, director of the Center for Arts and Culture. "They have a big stake in this. They have markets to protect."
Still, more than money will be necessary for cultural diplomacy to be effective; entrenched anti-Americanism will take years of persuasion - and, in some cases, policy changes by Washington - to be reversed. And here experts add a caveat: for cultural diplomacy to be effective, it must emphasize broader American values over the specific interests of any administration. In the cold war, at least, patience was rewarded.
The following op ed by John Hughes conveys a couple of fundamental misunderstandings and/or factual errors. One, the International Visitor program did not disappear with USIA, as Hughes implies. It still brings foreign leaders to the US. See this State Department Web page for a description of the program and a link to current projects.
Two, the private exchanges Hughes mentions have existed for decades. They're not something that's been developed recently to replace government exchanges.
"'Cultural Diplomacy' Is Key to Winning Hearts and Minds," by John Hughes - The Christian Science Monitor, 26 Oct 2005
SALT LAKE CITY - Over the years, the United States government has targeted a string of foreign individuals destined for greatness and brought them to America to be steeped in the culture and ways of Americans, and be exposed to the strengths and weaknesses of the American political system. They came on an international visitor program and though they may not have necessarily agreed with the policies of any particular administration, they generally left with warm memories of individual Americans and respect for American institutions.
The list includes people such as the late Anwar Sadat, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and later Prime Minister Tony Blair, Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. It is tempting to speculate whether Saddam Hussein, had he visited the US on this program, might have taken a different tack in his relationship with the US.
Most of these visits were orchestrated by the United States Information Agency (USIA) as part of its public diplomacy mission - engaging in dialogue with the publics of other nations, and spreading understanding of US principles and values.
With the demise of the cold war, public diplomacy ceased to be a priority and funding for it declined sharply. US cultural centers, libraries, and information offices abroad were closed. Finally, in 1999, USIA was abolished, its remnants located in the State Department. Today the budget for educational and cultural programs is about 4 percent of the overall State Department budget and about three-tenths of 1 percent of the Pentagon's annual budget.
The private sector continues with some of the former programs. Journalistic organizations, for example, bring key editors to the US to study American media organizations in all their strengths and weaknesses. Similarly, teachers and doctors and writers are hosted by various professional groups, but resources for such programs are generally leaner than even those available through government programs....
President Bush has installed Karen Hughes, his closest media strategist, as undersecretary for public diplomacy at the State Department. She and Secretary Rice have the president's ear. On their desks last month was deposited the intriguing report of an advisory committee on cultural diplomacy made up of distinguished American citizens. They argue that alongside radio and TV broadcasting to foreign countries, and all the other media programs designed to explain and further political policies, cultural diplomacy "reveals the soul of a nation." American art, dance, film, jazz, and literature continue to inspire people the world over despite our political differences. Cultural diplomacy, say the advisory committee members, "demonstrates our values, and our interest in values, and combats the popular notion that Americans are shallow, violent, and godless."
The group has specific recommendations. Predictably, they want more funding for the training of foreign service officers responsible for public and cultural diplomacy. But there are other ideas such as a major project to translate into foreign languages thousands of the best American books in many fields for placing in libraries, universities, and study centers in other countries.
The committee wants visa issues streamlined for international students, many of whom have been avoiding American universities since 9/11. They want access to the US improved for international exchange visitors. They want more Arab and Muslim artists, performers, and writers invited to the US, with their US counterparts encouraged to go to the Islamic world. They want world affairs councils in American cities to seek more public-private partnerships for international visitors.
They want a government unit dedicated to acquiring selected private sector US film and television properties for showing overseas.
The committee echoes the report of the 9/11 commission: "If the US does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world, the extremists will gladly do the job for us."
That should be a warning for Ms. Hughes and Dr. Rice to press with great validity at the White House.
Added 28 Oct 2005:
"Cultural Diplomacy," by Chris Meserole - the Huffington Post, as posted to Yahoo! News, 27 Oct 2005
...In yesterday's IHT, Alan Riding....[asked,] "with Washington now dusting off public diplomacy as a strategy to combat rampant anti-Americanism, is it time to revive cultural diplomacy?"
The answer is yes, but it would have to be far more nuanced than the cultural diplomacy of the Cold War. For all its dogmatism and internecine conflict, socialism never quite became a religion (indeed, Lenin did nothing if not insure against the possibility that it would), and as a result it could be confronted on a conceptual level without concern for the sensitivities we attach to religious meaning.
Yet when it comes to brandishing America's reputation in the Arabic world — and let us be frank, that is what the current debates over cultural diplomacy are really about — there isn't nearly the same margin for error. Cultural overkill in Europe circa 1980 meant a casual shrug of the shoulders, perhaps even a wry laugh at the kitschy excess. Not so today. Cultural overkill now means further insulting the integrity and honor of the very populations that we hope to engage....
I think Meserole is absolutely right when he says that Cold War-style cultural diplomacy won't work in the Arab and Muslim worlds, but for a different reason than the one he cites.
The more I read about post-World War II public diplomacy, the more I suspect that its effect rested less on a 'battle of ideas' than on a contest of loyalties. Our strategy wasn't so much to make friends in communist countries as it was to encourage alienation between rulers and the ruled. American culture was like that mouthy, monied brat you don't like your kid spending time with. Our example alone encourage dissent and disrespect.
The problem with applying this strategy to public diplomacy in Muslim and Arabic societies is that the United States does not have the same relationship with audiences in those countries that it did with audiences in Europe and the Soviet Union. When encouraged to side with Americans and jazz and Whitmanesque rhetoric against a grey communist authority with pretty shallow historical roots, most Russians and Poles and Czechs probably didn't face much of a moral crisis. But it's not even clear who we would want Arabs and Muslims to be alienated from. 'Al Qaeda' is a problematic answer because it's not at all clear that many Arabs or Muslims felt any real regard for the group or its members to begin with; 'terrorists' is a problematic answer because it includes figures whom many Arabs and Muslims regard as legitimate nationalists; 'Islam' is a very problematic answer because it inherently smears Islam. Moreover, the United States, fairly or not, is widely seen as the inheritor of colonial baggage in the Middle East. Asked to choose sides between Americans and anyone who is a fellow Muslim or Arab, most Muslims and Arabs are likely, at least publicly, to stay loyal to their own.
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